Nonprofi t organizations in transition countries experience low trust and consequently low income from donations. The study introduces one particular solution to the problem, certifi cation, and examines its impact on the quality of the nonprofi t organizations in the market. The situation is illustrated in a game theoretical model, with a manager, donor, certifi er, and the charity providing a charitable good: for simplicity, charity is either good or bad: A good charity spends all the resources on the charitable good, and a bad one diverts all resources to the private consumption of its manager (for-profi t in disguise). We show that for a wide parameter range and for two different disclosure rules, the presence of a certifi er in the market increases the incentives for managers to choose good charities, leading to an improvement in the market as the share of good charities increases.
Introduction
During two decades from the fall of the command economic system the Central and Eastern European region experienced radical changes on its way towards the market system. The key changes occurred in the areas of ownership and institutional framework (e.g. Estrin et al., 2009) , with the underlying change in the perception of freedom: to speak and to associate, to own and to be responsible for one's own life. In result, the fall of communism brought about an establishment, or rather re-birth, of civil society 1 : There has been a rapid growth in the number of nonprofi t organizations active in a variety of fi elds, with an often turbulent evolution in the sectors over time (for an overview, see e.g. Pospíšil and Hyánek, 2009; Brhlíková, 2004; Frič, 2004; Svítková, 2004) . In this paper we evaluate the current situation and identify the key challenges for the non-profi t sector.
The key challenges facing the nonprofi t sectors in transition countries of the CEE region 20 years after the fall of communism are well summarized in Forbrig's article published 1 Some might argue that it was for the lack of these freedoms that the communism fell. The causality is not relevant for the arguments in the paper.
 543 in the recent USAID NGO Sustainability Index report (USAID, 2010) . Forbrig identifi es three main challenges: 1. The need to clearly defi ne the relationship between the sector and the government; 2. The need to re-focus from the region on the situations in the individual countries because the differences among the countries in the region have grown; 3. Financial viability of the sector after the foreign donors have left and the economic situation in the countries is hit by the economic crisis.
The current paper offers a theoretical analysis of a possible solution addressing the fi rst and the third challenge. These challenges have a common underlying cause: a continued lack of trust in the nonprofi t sector and its organizations (e.g. Pospíšil and Hyánek, 2009; USAID, 2010; Hanousek, Kočenda, Svítková, 2010) . Lack of trust in the capacity of nonprofi ts and their ability to deliver services of high quality translates into lower donations and general support from the public, companies and the government. It also serves the government as a justifi cation to continue providing the social services either directly or through its own entities. Nonprofi t organizations in the CEE countries are therefore unable to effectively enter into the domains that are typically served by their counterparts in the western countries, in particular health and social services.
The solution we propose and examine in the present study is an establishment of an independent certifi cation agency that evaluates quality of nonprofi t organizations that voluntarily apply for certifi cation. As demonstrated in previous studies certifi cation by an independent nonprofi t organization is one of the most effi cient solutions that help to improve trust in nonprofi t organizations (Bekkers, 2003 (Bekkers, , 2010 Bias, 2010; Svítková and Ortmann, 2006) . In previous related work ( Svítková and Ortmann, 2006) we explored the design of the certifi cation system, namely, certifi er's choice of quality and price as a function of his optimization function. We omitted an important aspect: the possible impact of the certifi er on the quality of charities in the market. Thus, we analyzed an adverse selection problem between the donor and a charity, and assumed that the quality of charity is given exogenously. The current paper relaxes this assumption and allows the quality of charities to be determined within the model, i.e. we explore a moral hazard problem. This approach responds to the evidence provided by Bekkers (2003 Bekkers ( , 2010 ) that certifi cation may have impact on the average quality of charities in the market.
We explore the impact of certifi cation agency on a decision of a manager regarding the quality of the nonprofi t organization he runs. The model follows the logic of Akerlof (1982) and illustrates that under a wide parameter range the presence of a certifi er in the market increases incentives for managers to run a good charity, leading to an increase in the quality of charities in the market. This presents a strong argument for introduction of certifi cation to the markets with asymmetric information. Certifi cation agency that would have positive impact on trust through increased transparency and accountability (Bekkers, 2003 (Bekkers, , 2010 Ortmann et al., 2005) and positive impact on quality of organizations would benefi t the sectors in CEE countries and help them to address the challenges they currently face.
The article is structured as follows: Section 2 introduces the assumptions of the model, Section 3.1 describes the model, its timing and structure and results. Section 3.2 summarizes the choice of the charity, Section 3.3 analyzes the decision of the manager, Section 3.4 examines a certifi cation with an alternative disclosure rule. Section 4 concludes.
Assumptions
We analyze a game with four players: donor, charity, manager, and a certifi er. We specify the assumptions on their behavior below. The timing and detailed structure of the game follows in Section 3.
We study the decision of one representative manager, who chooses the quality of the organization he runs to maximize his utility. The manager is uniquely identifi ed by his preference for the provision of a charitable good, α, a random variable with uniform distribution on the unit interval [0, 1].
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We assume that the utility function of the manager is a convex combination of private consumption, X, and a charitable good, Q. Thus, U(X, Q) = αQ + (1 − α)X. We assume that the manager maximizes his utility subject to a budget constraint and that the only source of revenues for the charity is fundraising, i.e., received donations net of the costs of fundraising.
For simplicity, we assume that the charity can be of two types only: 'good' with quality 1, or 'bad' with quality 0. The manager of the organization chooses the type to maximize his utility. A good charity cares about the provision of the charitable good and spends all collected available resources on its provision. A bad charity is a 'for-profi t in disguise' (Weisbrod, 1988 ) that exists to maximize the income of its manager by abusing the nonprofi t status and trust of donors, and therefore it does not spend any resources at all on the provision of the charitable good.
The charity decides whether to apply for certifi cation (which is costly). If there is no certifi cation in the market, the charity has no decision to take. The charity maximizes its expected net revenue, therefore, tries to attract as many donations as possible. How it spends the money depends on the type of the charity and, ultimately, on the preference of the manager.
The expected quality of the charities in the market, denoted d, is defi ned by the preference of the manager, who is indifferent between choosing a good or a bad charity, we denote him α I : managers with higher preference for charitable good, α > α I , will set up a good charity, managers with lower preference, α < α I , will set up a bad charity. Hence, d = 1-α I . Thus, to observe the impact of certifi cation on the quality of charities in the market, we compare this 'indifferent' manager in a market with and without certifi cation.
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The certifi er chooses the certifi cation fee, c, 3 and the detection technology, p, to evaluate the applying charities. In the present study, we do not analyze how the certifi er makes this decision; we examine how these parameters affect the choices of the other players. 4 The results we present are therefore dependent on these parameters. We assume that the certifi er is honest and as such the certifi er issues a certifi cate to the charities that apply for certifi cation, pay certifi cation fee, and pass the evaluation.
We assume, in line with what we observe (Guet, 2002) , that the certifi er evaluates charities on a number of indicators but he summarizes the result into a single number in the interval [0, 1] . The number represents the observed quality of the charity, as we assume only a good or a bad charity, the number represents the probability that the charity a good one. Certifi er's observation is uniquely determined by the quality of the detection technology, p (the probability that a charity is awarded the certifi cate when it is entitled to): A good charity is awarded the certifi cate with probability p, the bad charity is awarded the certifi cate by mistake, i.e., when it is not entitled to, with probability 1−p. 5 We assume that the probability of a mistake is smaller than the probability of correct identifi cation, p ∈ [1/2, 1].
6 With perfect detection, p = 1, the certifi er would identify the good charity as good without mistakes, i.e. he would observe the true quality. Based on this probability the certifi er awards or rejects to award the certifi cate.
We assume one representative donor.
7 She has a budget normalized to 1 and she decides how much to donate to maximize her utility from the charitable good she cares about. The donor cannot observe the quality of the charitable good, but she realizes it depends on the quality of the providing charity. Specifi cally, the donor understands that supporting a 3
The existing certifi cation agencies typically charge a fee that increases in the size of the organization. It is typically composed of a fi xed and a proportional part, Guet (2002) . Thus, we can assume c is a fee for a charity of 'unit' size and as such it remains constant.
4
For an analysis of a certifi er's choice for various objective functions see Svítková and Ortmann (2006) .
5
We assume, for simplicity, that the detection technology is symmetric, i.e. the probability that a good charity is evaluated as good is equal to the probability that a bad charity is evaluated as bad. We maintain this assumption, because we think that what matters in evaluation is the distance from the standard, and not the direction of this difference: it is diffi cult to observe quality of charities at the standard, but it is easy to discover the very good or very bad organizations.
6
The probability of correct identifi cation, p, is derived from a detection procedure: Let ε denote the range of possible qualities the certifi er may assign to a charity he evaluates. ε represents the 'mistakes' in the evaluation, the diffi culty to observe the true values. We assume that a good charity is evaluated as good with probability distributed uniformly in the interval [1−ε, 1], a bad charity is assigned probabilities in the interval [0, ε] . We assume ε ∈ [1/2, 1]. The best technology, ε = 1/2, ensures that the certifi er is certain about the quality of the evaluated charity, otherwise, he makes mistakes. From the assumption that the observable quality is distributed uniformly follows p = 1/2ε and 1−p = 1-1/2ε. ε ∈[1/2, 1] implies p ≥ 1/2, i.e. a good charity is awarded the certifi cate more often than a bad one for all detection technologies.
7
Assuming a representative donor avoids the problem of free riding, which often occurs in fundraising. We use this simplifying assumption to be able to focus on the moral hazard problem.
bad charity means no provision of the charitable good, while supporting a good charity means the highest quality and amount of the charitable good.
8
The donor cannot observe the quality of the charity she wants to support; she is only able to observe its expected quality. Donor's utility, and hence her donation, therefore depends on the expected quality of the charity, U D (p). We assume that the donation (giving) is identical to the utility obtained from supporting a charity with expected quality p, g(p) = U D (p). Donor's utility increases in the expected quality of the charity, U D '(p)>0, it is maximized when she supports a good charity, U D (1)=U max = 1 (the maximum is normalized to 1, the maximum donations she can give), and it is zero when she would support a bad charity,
In a market without certifi cation the donor knows only the average quality of the charity in the market. Due to this asymmetric information problem, she donates less than she would if she knew the charity was good.
In a market with certifi cation the donor obtains additional information: she observes also whether the charity has the certifi cate, and she knows the certifi cation fee and quality of the detection technology. 9 The donor uses this information to update her prior beliefs about the quality of the charity, and gives accordingly. If the certifi er ensures that only a good charity receives the certifi cate, the donation to the certifi ed charity is the highest possible, 1.
10 However, even in this case, a non-certifi ed charity receives a positive donation too. This is caused by the fact that there are mistakes in the evaluation technology and therefore even a good charity may be rejected a certifi cate (by mistake). The donor cannot distinguish whether the charity does not have a certifi cate because it did not apply or because it applied but failed the evaluation (due to a mistake).
11
With the worst detection technology, p = 1/2, the probability that a good charity receives the certifi cate is equal to the probability that a bad charity receives it. The probability that a good charity fails to pass the evaluation is the highest possible, and the donor makes the smallest difference in her support of certifi ed and non-certifi ed organizations. With perfect detection, p = 1, a good charity is always awarded the certifi cate. The donor relies PRAGUE ECONOMIC PAPERS, 4, 2013  547 on the signal and gives a donation to the certifi ed charity only, the difference between her support of a good and a bad charity is the highest, 1.
Model and Results

Timing of the game
1. Preference of the manager, α, is randomly drawn from a uniform distribution over [0, 1] . The conditions of the certifi cation system are set: the fee for certifi cation, c, and the quality of detection technology, p. 2. The manager chooses quality of the charity he runs, he decides between a good charity, of quality 1, and a bad one, of quality 0, maximizing his utility function. 3. The charity chooses whether to apply for certifi cation maximizing its expected net revenues. 4. If the charity has applied for certifi cation, the certifi er evaluates it and awards the certifi cate if it passes the evaluation. 5. The donor adjusts her beliefs about the quality of the charity based on the information she receives: whether the organization has been certifi ed, the certifi cation fee, and the quality of detection technology. She gives accordingly.
We solve the game in two steps. First, we solve for the optimal strategy of the charity in the subgame between the charity and the donor given the certifi cation system. Second, we solve the full game, identifying the equilibrium strategy of the manager, and the indifferent manager α I . For comparison we start with the benchmark case -the market without certifi cation.
Decision of a charity
No certifi cation
In the market without certifi cation the donor knows the probability that the charity is good, d NC . 12 She cannot observe the true quality of the charity, and therefore gives according to her expectations, g(d NC ). In this case the charity does not have any decision to make.
Certifi cation
In the market with certifi cation a charity decides whether to apply for certifi cation and send the donor a signal about its quality. If it applies for certifi cation, it goes through the evaluation and obtains the certifi cate with probability p if it is a good charity, and probability 1 − p if it is a bad charity. The charity chooses the strategy that ensures higher expected payoff. The subgame has four types of equilibria: A separating equilibrium, in which only the good charity applies, a pooling equilibrium, in which both types apply, a pooling equilibrium in which the good charity applies and the bad one applies with a positive probability, and a pooling equilibrium, in which both types do not apply.
The separating equilibrium arises if only the good charity applies for certifi cation and the bad charity does not apply. The equilibrium is characterized by the following incentive compatibility constraints:
Constraint (1) requires that the bad charity is better off not applying (NA) for certifi cation. Constraint (2) requires that the good one is better off applying (A). In this separating equilibrium, the charity with the certifi cate is known to be of quality 1, thus, it obtains the highest possible payoff, 1. The non-certifi ed charity can be either good or bad, its payoff g NC depends on the probability that it is good, g NC = g (Prob[1|NC] ). This probability is:
Prob Prob NC dp Prob NC Prob Prob Prob NC dp
Where d denotes the initial probability that the charity in the market is good.
Simplifying and rearranging the constraints (1) and (2) we derive that the certifi cation fee c within the following range leads to a separating equilibrium:
Intuitively, the certifi cation fee that induces separation increases as the difference in the payoff to the certifi ed and non-certifi ed charity increases because an increase in this difference means that the incentives for the bad type to apply for certifi cation are higher. The certifi er decreases these incentives by increasing the costs of certifi cation, i.e. charging a higher fee. The quality of the detection technology, p, increases the range of fees the certifi er may charge. A certifi er with perfect technology, p = 1, may charge any fee in the interval [0, 1] and still induce separation because he relies solely on evaluation and not on the fee. With technology of lower quality the certifi er's reliance on the fee increases and the range of fees leading to separation is smaller. The worst technology, p = 1/2, leaves no choice -the only fee inducing separation is
If the certifi er charges a fee below c min , the incentive compatibility constraint for the bad type (1) is not satisfi ed. In this case, the game has two types of equilibria: a pooling equilibrium, in which both types of charity apply for certifi cation, and an equilibrium in mixed strategies, with the good charity always applying and the bad charity applying with a positive probability.
In the pooling equilibrium, both types apply for certifi cation and are evaluated; the good charity receives the certifi cate with higher probability. The donor evaluates the expected  549
probability that a charity with and without the certifi cate is good, and gives accordingly. The payoffs in the pooling equilibrium are the following:
Cp dp gg dp d p
NCp dp gg dp d p
The participation constraints defi ning the pooling equilibrium look as follows:
Constraint (7) ensures participation of the bad type. Because the expected payoff of the bad type is always below that of the good type, the good type participates whenever the bad type does (constraint (8) is satisfi ed). We denote the fee at which the constraint (7) binds c max,p .
If the certifi er charges a fee in the interval [c max,p , c min ], there does not exist an equilibrium in pure strategies. While the good charity always applies, the bad one chooses to apply with some probability (less than one).
If the certifi er charges a fee above the maximum fee guaranteeing separation, c max , then neither bad nor good type applies for certifi cation. Certifi cation in this case has no effect on the situation in the market and we do not need to consider this case any further. Figure 1 summarizes the different type of equilibria arising in the market as a function of the certifi cation fee. The equilibrium is described by the choice of the good charity, and the choice of the bad charity to apply (A) or to not apply (NA). 
Decision of the manager
In this section we analyze the manager's choice of the quality of the organization he runs. We identify the manager who is indifferent between running a good or a bad charity, α I , defi ning the quality of the organization in the market, d; d = 1 − α I . We fi rst consider the benchmark case without certifi cation, d NC , then we observe how it changes in a market with certifi cation, d C .
The manager chooses the type of organization that maximizes his utility, comparing:
The bad charity spends all collected donations on manager's private consumption, generating utility (1 − α)X. The good charity spends all collected donations on provision of the charitable good, generating utility αQ. The expected payoffs of the charity, E[.|0 or 1], were defi ned in the previous sections (equations (1) and (2)).
No certifi cation
In the market without certifi cation the donor cannot distinguish between a good and a bad charity, she gives according to the expected probability that the charity is good. The payoffs to the two types are therefore equal. With the uniform distribution of manager's preferences, the indifferent manager is the one in the middle:
Certifi cation
The impact of certifi cation on the decision of the manager, α C , and thus the quality of the charity in the market, d C , depends on the detection technology, p, and the certifi cation fee, c. The following proposition specifi es.
Proposition:
Certifi cation with a fee below c max,p , increases the expected quality of the organization in the market, Certifi cation with a fee at and above c max has no impact on the quality of the organization in the market, d C = d NC , for all qualities of detection technology. Similarly, certifi cation with the worst detection technology, p = 1/2, has no impact on the quality of the organization in the market. The result does not depend on the fee.
Certifi cation with a fee below c max,p leads to a pooling equilibrium (see Section 3.2.2). Certifi cation in this case, despite the fact that both types apply for certifi cation, brings additional information because the certifi er awards the certifi cate more often to the good charity. The donor, therefore, ends up giving more to the good charity. The difference in the payoff to the good and the bad charity increases in the quality of detection technology, as better detection means that the probability of good charity having the certifi cate is higher. An increase in the certifi cation fee has the same effect on the payoffs of both charities, but because the probability that a bad type receives the certifi cate is lower, his expected payoff is lower. An increase in the certifi cation fee, though, has a different impact on the utility of managers running good and bad charities. The difference depends on his preference for the charitable good, α. Managers with α < 1/2 running a bad charity, i.e., getting utility (1 − α)X, suffer more from the increase of the fee than managers with higher α. Therefore, increasing the fee decreases the incentives to start a bad charity for managers with low preference for the charitable good, the effect is the strongest at the highest fee ensuring pooling equilibrium, c max,p . The effect increases in the quality of the detection technology as illustrated in Figure 2 below, the dashed line.
Certifi cation with a fee in the interval [c min , c max ], see (4), leads to a separating equilibrium. In this case only the utility of the manager choosing a good charity decreases in the fee for certifi cation. Utility of the manager running a bad charity is not directly affected by the fee because the bad charity does not apply for certifi cation. The difference in the payoff to the good and the bad charity decreases as the fee increases. Therefore, it is suffi cient to consider the effect of certifi cation in the two polar cases, when the certifi er charges the highest and the lowest fee leading to separation.
If the certifi er charges the highest fee (the good charity is indifferent between applying and not, the incentive compatibility constraint (2) holds with equality), he extracts the whole surplus the charity gains from the certifi cate. The expected payoff of the charity with the certifi cate, and therefore the utility from running such a charity, is the same as it would be in the market without certifi cation. This certifi cation therefore has no impact on the quality of the charity in the market; i.e. the probability that a charity is good, d C , and, the indifferent manager α C , remain the same. The result is independent of the detection technology, p. The only service provided by the certifi er is the information provided to the donor, who learns something about the charity she supports. Nevertheless, this has no effect on the fi nal provision of the charitable good because, even though the donor gives more if she learns that the charity is good, the surplus donation ends up in the pocket of the certifi er.
If the certifi er charges the lowest fee ensuring separation (the bad charity is indifferent between applying and not, the incentive compatibility constraint (1) holds with equality), the utility from running a good charity is signifi cantly above that from running a bad one because the certifi er leaves the surplus brought by the certifi cate to the charity. Therefore, even a manager with a weaker preference for the charitable good prefers to run a good charity. The analytical solution defi ning α C , thus d C , exists but it does not have any intuitive form, therefore, we illustrate it in Figure 2 , the full line.
14 The probability that a charity is good is higher than in the benchmark market with no certifi cation, i.e., the indifferent manager has lower preference for the charitable good.
The result is valid for all detection technologies, but the impact of certifi cation (the difference between d NC = 1/2 and d NC ) varies: Certifi cation with the worst detection technology, p = 1/2, has no impact on the market, the probability that the charity is good is the same as in the market with no certifi cation. 15 As the quality of detection increases the probability that a charity is good increases. As the quality of detection approaches its maximum, p → 1, probability that the charity is good approaches 1, d C → 1, i.e., α C → 0, a manager with any preference chooses to run a good charity. Intuitively, with perfect detection the good charity applies for certifi cation and obtains the certifi cate with certainty. Thus, the probability that there is a good charity among the non-certifi ed is 0, and the non-certifi ed charities receive no donation. The manager with any preference, therefore, has no incentive to run such charity. 15 This results from the fact that with the worst technology the certifi er relies solely on the certifi cation fee to induce separation of good and bad organizations, there is only one fee he can charge. He leaves no surplus for the good charities, and hence no additional incentives for managers to start a good charity.
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Alternative disclosure rule
In this section we examine the impact of a certifi cation with an alternative disclosure rule: the certifi er discloses to the donor not only who has the certifi cate (C, NC), but also who has applied for certifi cation (A, NA). 16 Thus, the donor distinguishes three types of charity: charity that applies and receives the certifi cate, it receives a donation g AC , charity that applies and fails to receive the certifi cate, g ANC , and charity that does not apply, g NA . This alternative disclosure rule is appealing because it seems that it may lead to perfect separation: if only the good charity applies for certifi cation and the donor knows about it, giving to the bad charity drops to zero and giving to the good non-certifi ed charity increases. Nevertheless, none of the certifi cation agencies operating in fundraising markets (Svítková and Ortmann, 2006; Guet, 2002) uses this type of disclosure.
First, we examine the existence of the separating equilibrium, as we expect the new disclosure to have the strongest effect in this case. In the separating equilibrium only the good charity applies for certifi cation, it passes the evaluation and receives the certifi cate with probability p and fails with probability (1 − p). Because the donor observes also who has applied for certifi cation and who has not, and knows that the bad charity never applies, she gives nothing to the charity that has not applied for certifi cation, and 1 to the charity that has applied for certifi cation regardless of the result, i.e. charity with and without the certifi cate receives the same donation. But, this presents very strong incentive for the bad charity to apply: even if it fails the evaluation the donor would consider it good because she relies on the apply/not apply information and not on the result of evaluation. Thus, the bad type also applies, the certifi er is not able to stop him because the donor makes no difference between the certifi ed and non-certifi ed charity, hence the separating equilibrium does not exist. In terms of the incentive compatibility constraints:
In the case when the original certifi cation system leads to a separating and the system with the alternative disclosure leads to a pooling equilibrium, c min ≤ c ≤ Min{c max,a , c max }, the equilibrium payoffs differ. In the separating equilibrium, the impact of certifi cation is the highest at the minimum fee, c min , which leaves the highest surplus for the good charity while preventing the bad charity from applying. Increasing the fee above c min leads to a decrease in the surplus of the good charity, decreasing the incentives for the manager to choose a good charity. In the pooling equilibrium in the system with alternative disclosure, increasing the fee has negative effect on the good and the bad charity as they both pay the fee. Therefore, the surplus donation to the good charity, thus, the incentive to choose a good charity, decreases more slowly than in the separating equilibrium. The difference decreases also as the quality of detection increases, as detection is the main source of information in the pooling equilibrium. Therefore, for fees above c min there exists a detection technology p a above which the new certifi cation ensures higher quality of organizations in the market.
20
In the case when the original certifi cation leads to a pooling equilibrium with no type applying for certifi cation, and the new certifi cation leads to a pooling equilibrium with both types applying, c max ≤ c ≤ c max,a , the original system has no impact on the quality in the market, while the new system increases quality. If the certifi cation fee is too high (above 1), the alternative disclosure also leads to a pooling equilibrium with no type applying for certifi cation. This is the same situation as in the original system with the fee above c max .
The choice of the certifi er depends on the budget he has available, the costs of the detection technology, and his objective function. But, if the certifi er wants to reach the highest improvement of quality in the market, he shall charge the lowest fee that leads to separation, c min , and keep the original disclosure rule. He shall turn to the alternative disclosure only if he was forced to charge a higher fee. This may occur, for example, if the technology costs too much.
Conclusion
In the present study we modelled the impact of certifi cation on the quality of organizations in the market. We showed that the certifi er is able to increase the quality by increasing the incentives for the managers to choose a good charity. This result presents a strong argument for the introduction of a certifi cation agency to a market with asymmetric information, i.e. markets with low trust and transparency as observed in the transition countries. The certifi er minimizes the negative impact of the asymmetric information by offering a credible signal which allows the good charities to distinguish themselves from the bad ones, donors follow this signal and increase their support to the (identifi ed) good charities. More funding available for the good charities motivates even managers with lower preference for charitable good to start a good charity, decreasing the number of bad charities in the market and gradually improving the quality in the market.
The design of the certifi cation system is crucial for the success of the initiative: We illustrated that the impact of certifi cation depends on the choice of the detection technology and certifi cation fee-different combinations of the two aspects lead to different equilibria, which in turn have different effects on the behavior of managers. Specifi cally, if the fee is too low, both types of charity apply for certifi cation and the certifi er relies solely on the evaluation to distinguish the good organization from the bad one. With a higher fee, it becomes too costly for the bad type to apply for certifi cation: A separating equilibrium arises in which only the good type applies. If the certifi er increases the fee further, it becomes too costly even for the good type, and no type applies for certifi cation. The impact on quality is strongest with the lowest fee ensuring separation of good and bad. At this point, the bad charity has no interest in applying, while the good charity is left with the highest surplus for its operation. The impact increases in the detection technology: an improvement of technology increases the difference in the payoff to the certifi ed and the non-certifi ed charity, increasing the incentives for the manager to choose a good charity.
The disclosure rule is another factor that affects the impact of the certifi cation system: we illustrated that the standard Certifi ed/Non-certifi ed disclosure rule can lead to separation of the good and bad charities, while the alternative Did-not-Apply/ Applied//Certifi ed/Non-certifi ed disclosure rule cannot. Certifi cation with the standard disclosure rule therefore has larger positive impact on quality in the market. However, under specifi c circumstances, e.g. too high certifi cation fees leading to a pooling equilibrium with the standard disclosure, the alternative rule may offer better results and might be preferred.
These results prove that there is a mechanism that can help the nonprofi t organizations in the transition countries build trust and improve their relationship with the stakeholders. According to the results, the optimal design of the certifi er recommends that he shall charge for the services, but the fee must be kept rather low and he must distinguish the organizations primarily using a good detection technology. This is a sound solution that has a potential to be accepted by the market as well: if the fee would be too high, it would be prohibitively high for the nonprofi ts and it would be considered unethical by the donors (who want to support nonprofi t's cause and not quality assurance). To gain broad acceptance by the public, the simple disclosure Certifi ed/Non-certifi ed shall be supplemented by transparent behavior of the certifi ed organizations. This will allow the stakeholders to assess their results themselves, shall they be interested, but will allow them to rely on the certifi cate, shall they choose to do so.
The implications of the model can be further strengthened by further generalization of the model: assuming a continuum of charities with different qualities or consider different giving behavior of the donor. The model can be also extended to consider the choice of the certifi er and consider alternative certifi ers, who would be limited in their operations by different budget constraints.
